owe more to accidental fortune than to planned, rational calculation. Policy-making, in this conception, is a messy, political business whose outcomes may be fortuitous or disastrous, and often unintended. For Kingdon, the chances of achieving policy goals are greater when there is a window of opportunity in which the three streams of action come together to enable policy to be made authoritatively. Yet while this resolves the debate over values, it does not in itself guarantee successful implementation.
In the Hong Kong context, bearing in mind the caveat that policy-making might not always occur as a logical sequence of events, it may still be helpful to try to clarify the policy process by distinguishing the different processes involved in policy-making -the role of values and policy actors, the role of public institutions, the location of power within the system, and so on. We should note that the dominant mode of policymaking in the colonial period has persisted beyond 1997. However, the government now operates in a more turbulent political environment, especially in its relationship with civil society organisations, and seeks to deal with policy issues in rather different ways from its predecessor. In consequence, there are at least two styles of policy-making. One mode, which we characterise as rational, has its origins in the policy formulation style of colonial times. The other, which is much closer to the situation which Kingdon describes, reflects the politics of policy-making in the post-1997 period.
The four stages outlined below cannot always be assumed to follow each other sequentially but, in whatever context or order they occur, they are central to the nature of the policy process and are used as a framework for this chapter:
• the predominant values represented in the policy formulation process (values and the policy agenda); • the location of power within the system and the role of institutions in formulating specific policies (power and the institutional framework); • the nature of consultation and participation, that is, the extent to which the policymaking system is open or closed (consultation and participation); and • the types of policies that are actually produced (content and outputs).
For much of the colonial period, policy-making gives the impression of a rational sequence in the order listed above. The administration was insulated from popular pressures and debates over values and the policy agenda were decided with minimal public consultation. Policy decisions were reached after careful consideration within the government and were usually incremental adjustments to long-established practices which eventually proved insufficient to meet the demands of the community. In the 1970s, the MacLehose administration introduced more distributive policies and more attention was given to the provision of collective goods, such as education and housing.
After the Sino-British Agreement in 1984, the character of policy-making changed again. Values were often agreed but implementation sometimes faltered in the face of opposition from political and social groups; policy initiatives were often largely symbolic. In the post-1997 era, lack of institutional co-ordination in a disarticulated system contributed to the emergence of disjointed policies which were sometimes poorly implemented. Policy became much more contentious and seemingly less rational and ordered and the process became more fragmented and less authoritative. Yet there is historical continuity in policy-making so that values, institutions and processes may all be incorporated in the new mix. Some policies, even in post-1997 Hong Kong, continue to be made in largely the same way as before the retrocession.
The most significant new factor affecting policy-making in post-1997 Hong Kong has been the rise of civil society. Under the Tung administration, the inclination initially was to try to implement policy whether or not this brought the government into conflict with civil society organisations. While policy could still be formulated by an "executiveled" government, its implementation gradually became more difficult. Civil society groups grew in strength 7 and, even more problematic for the government, sometimes emerged following formal legislative approval of a policy. After the watershed July 2003 demonstrations against the introduction of national security laws, the ability of the government to introduce new policies was severely constrained by the fear that they would provoke similar reactions from the public. Under Tsang, although there was some improvement in policy co-ordination and consultation with the public, the government's policy capacity remained in doubt.
8 Unpopular policies, such as the goods and services tax, were abandoned at the process stage when it became clear that there would be substantial organised opposition to their implementation.
In the remainder of this chapter, we analyse why these changes have taken place, why some features of the system remain and others do not, why policy capacity and the ability to introduce new policies is low, and what consequences have resulted from problems with formulation and implementation.
Policy-Making under Colonial Rule
In the following section, we consider the political underpinnings of the colonial style of policy-making and how it related to rationality.
Values and the Policy Agenda
Values impinge on the policy process in many different ways. At the most general level, they are implicit in regime values, which are an underlying component of the political system and which may have a determining influence on the way in which concrete policies are devised.
9 Regime values provide a polity with its legitimacy. They provide the justification for the use of coercive action and the persuasive reference point when a government needs popular support. They may relate closely to more specific policy values, in the sense that there is congruence between what a regime stands for and what its specific policies represent, or there may be a vast distance between the ideals on which the polity is founded and the concrete policies that the government is actually formulating and implementing. What were those regime values in colonial Hong Kong? How did they translate into specific policies?
The dominant form of policy-making is determined largely by political factors. Under colonialism, the regime was concerned with maintaining its rule and with the associated problems of political stability and legitimacy. It wanted to encourage economic growth and believed that this could be achieved by keeping government small and by allowing business to have free rein, unrestricted by regulation. The fundamental concerns with political stability inevitably placed some constraints on government. Policy-making tended to be incremental because the functions of government were limited and did not change much and because they had usually been devised with the intent of maintaining stability or encouraging enterprise through free trade and a free port. To get new policies on the agenda was difficult. The government could not raise tax revenue for social policies without encountering fierce opposition. A low tax regime was a fundamental premise on which Hong Kong's fiscal policies were based.
Although this was essentially a system of colonial control, it was also one that was governed by well-respected conventions. The colonial administration would not tolerate threats to its rule. It did not normally intervene in the market and was often accused by business people of doing little to help them. But it also did little to regulate business and benign neglect served the interests of commerce well. The government's relationship with the people was distant. It legitimised its rule by arguing that the colonial administration provided good government and order and security which, implicitly, were not to be found across the border in China.
After the 1966-1967 riots, the government sought to address mounting social problems and to establish a better relationship with society. This meant that the values underlying policy also had to change. In contrast to the distance that had characterised relationships between government and people prior to the riots, the government now tried to bridge the gap and to move towards meeting more of their needs. The difference in the values underlying the policy-making system can be identified from a keynote speech by MacLehose to the Legislative Council in October 1972. Speaking of the need to improve housing conditions, he said:
… the inadequacy and scarcity of housing and all this implies … is one of the major and most constant sources of friction and unhappiness between the Government and the population. It offends alike our humanity, our civic pride and our political good sense.
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Governors, prior to MacLehose, would have been reluctant to make speeches which so clearly acknowledged government's moral responsibility to improve the social conditions of the population.
MacLehose's initiatives resulted in vastly increased, publicly-funded, social policy outputs. More housing units were built, new towns were constructed in the New Territories, social welfare and healthcare provision was increased and education was eventually extended to three years of compulsory secondary school. The government quickly learned that distributing social policy outputs in greater quantity could positively lift its political support. But there were costs, both to the long-standing value of "small government" and to the regime's traditional distant relationship with society. To provide more collective goods required a more interventionist approach. Of necessity, the civil service began to grow rapidly and the Hong Kong government began to take on the characteristics of a major service provider, a role that it had previously tried to avoid. At the outset of MacLehose's decade-long tenure, the administration probably believed that it could control the process of building a more prosperous, better-housed, healthier and better-educated population.
But social policy outputs have their own dynamics. The society that had emerged by the end of MacLehose's tenure in 1982 was markedly different from the immediate post-1967 period. Its members, particularly its educated members, wanted much more active participation in the affairs of the colony (now known as a territory). Pressure groups had become more critical of deficiencies in social policy and labour was more belligerent, particularly within the civil service where the staff associations had grown in number and strength. The professionals who provided the new services -teachers and social workers, for example -had their own views about how those services should be provided and what they should be paid for providing them. New values began to infiltrate the policy process. Consultation with the people became the leitmotif of the administration although government still claimed the right to make the final decision.
While the economy prospered and government had the ability to deliver desired collective goods, the values on which policy was based continued to receive widespread support. The government's control over the policy process, however, gradually declined. The decision to return the territory to China politicised the population, creating uncertainty and reducing confidence in the established order. The government came under siege from those who wanted to see a more democratic system in place before 1997, from an increasingly influential Chinese government, and from a variety of pressure groups seeking guarantees that their own positions would be safeguarded after the resumption of sovereignty. The government stuck to its previous commitments to distributive social policies but it was not able to implement them as forcefully as before and it had to develop policies with an eye to maintaining confidence in the system. In consequence, policy-making often had symbolic aims in which the articulation of the value sometimes seemed more important than its actual implementation.
By 1997, a much more dynamic, and sometimes contradictory, mix of values was influencing policy-making. There was pressure for a more active government that would address enduring social problems and which would set in place policies which could not be subverted by the Chinese government. For its part, the Chinese government seemed to want to inherit a system unchanged from unreformed colonial days; they sought to exclude the democratic parties from power. The British government's principal aim was to leave the territory with the minimal possible disruption and with its dignity intact. Until Patten became Governor in 1992, it tried to do as little as possible to offend the Chinese government. Policy became a hostage to these forces. In some cases, the government did take active measures to address concerns, to improve social conditions and to protect civil liberties. In others, policy remained largely symbolic because the government preferred to let sleeping dogs lie rather than risk more confrontational politics.
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Power and the Institutional Framework
Where does power reside in a system? Who has the authoritative right to decide which policies should be pursued and implemented and which should not? The location of power in a policy-making system is important because it is a critical factor influencing the way in which policy is made. If power is centralised, civil society relatively weak, and decisions can be effectively implemented, then the chances of following a sequential, planned policy process from formulation to implementation are greater. If power is diffuse, scattered among various institutions and groups within society, then policymaking becomes more difficult as different influential institutions or groups affect both policy formulation and implementation.
Power in classical colonial systems was invariably centralised and exercised through a hierarchically organised civil service. No institution challenged the authority of the Governor and the Secretariat. The government spoke with one voice and whatever disagreements existed between civil servants over policy were kept behind closed doors. The only occasional constraint on the local administration's ability to make policy autonomously was pressure from the British government to ensure that social and labour conditions in Hong Kong met basic standards.
12 Apart from these sporadic concerns, the colonial administration was usually left to its own devices. The Colonial Secretariat was the principal source of policy advice for the Governor and policy ideas were either generated within the Secretariat or from departmental proposals. The functions of government were very limited. Once policies were established, the changes that were required were largely incremental, mainly changing or tightening a regulation here or there. The Secretariat was not particularly responsive to attempts by government departments to change policies and vetted new proposals carefully. It saw itself as holding a monopoly over decision-making. To arrive at the point where policy was to be changed or initiated required the approval of the senior officials, the Governor, the Chief Secretary and the Financial Secretary. Without their support, nothing could be achieved; even with their support, a period of bargaining over resources usually followed.
13 When policy papers were finally agreed internally, they went to the Executive Council and the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council for further discussion and approval.
The changes introduced in the 1970s from a basically incremental to a more distributive system had important repercussions for the way in which policy was made. In 1973, the McKinsey consultants recommended the establishment of policy branches, staffed almost entirely by administrative officers, who would make policy, and departments which would implement it.
14 The division was never quite so clearcut because the separation between politics and administration implicit in the concept is not how policy-making is usually made. The departments had long experience of implementing policies and often firm ideas on what would or would not work. Administrative officers in the branches were liable to transfer every three years or so and had little specialist knowledge of the matters on which they were expected to make policy. There were other important shortcomings in the reforms. The consultants called for more programme and resource plans.
15 But there was some opposition within the civil service, especially from the Finance Branch and from the administrative grade. The Finance Branch was concerned that it might lose some control over resources. The administrative grade preferred the generalist policy-making system of the past and was reluctant to concede power to specialists.
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Power was more diffused after the reforms than under the old colonial system. The Secretariat still remained the central policy-making body and the administrative grade was still the dominant force in the formulation of policy. However, after 1984, the British and Chinese governments were informally able to exercise vetos on policy proposals in some areas. As the government itself became larger, the control exercised by the Secretariat over departments was slightly diminished simply because the thin layer of senior administrators was no longer able to supervise every aspect of government. Power remained centralised but there were many more actors in the policy-making process both within the civil service and outside it.
The institutional framework could not incorporate the emerging civil society groups. Business people and professionals continued to be over-represented on the Legislative Council; they dominated the advisory committees; and they were already playing a significant role on the Executive Council. New pressure groups were underrepresented and it was difficult to include them because many were focused on the political arrangements for the future, which were beyond the control of the Hong Kong government. Policy-making, by default, remained in the hands of the civil servants although they had difficulty, as 1997 approached, in persuading the Legislative Council that their policies were the best solutions to the territory's problems.
Consultation and Participation
During the colonial era, consultation and participation in policy-making were restricted and controlled in various ways. Until the 1970s, the location of power in an administration supported by the most powerful figures in the business world and in Chinese society meant that other elements of society were starved of access to the policy-making process. There were no political parties and pressure groups were slow to develop. When pressure groups did emerge, they tended to lobby departments, which did not have final decision-making power. The Legislative Council was also largely excluded from the policy-making process. Its members were sometimes influential behind the scenes in advisory committees but their role was essentially to validate policy rather than to formulate or criticise it. The Council was also entirely appointed by the Governor and was consequently composed of supporters of the government rather than its critics.
Because expectations were limited, popular protests were not concentrated on the government's policy shortcomings. Until the 1966 riots, demonstrations were seen as aberrations from the normal condition of social stability and were dealt with by tighter regulations. After MacLehose introduced his social policy reforms, political participation increased considerably. This was encouraged by the government to the extent that it sought to build its policies around "consultation and consent". New policy initiatives were often presented as green papers which were put to the public for comment. After a period of consultation, the government would issue a white paper which, it would argue, reflected the views of the community. The system fell into some disrepute as it gradually became clear that the government tended to ignore those views that did not correspond with its own. The most significant case in which this happened was over the issue of increasing the number of elected representatives in the Legislative Council in 1987, but it was also true of other areas of policy-making, such as education and the system for redressing grievances. 17 The government did make more effort to consult with groups affected by policy, but there were still institutional gaps in the ways in which policy-making was conducted.
The government also had relatively little control over the new pressure groups that began to emerge in the 1970s. Policy towards groups was based on regulation under the Societies Ordinance and attempts to fragment the labour movement. One consequence was the emergence of many small and fragmented groups and unions. There were exceptions, such as the Professional Teachers Union, which was able to build a more comprehensive organisation on the back of confrontations with the government over the status of certified teachers and the closure of the Precious Blood Jubilee School.
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Although the government might have wished to include groups in the policy process in a more meaningful way, it was increasingly constrained by the politics of the transition. Neither the British nor the Chinese governments favoured more democracy for Hong Kong in the 1980s. The Governors of the period, Youde and Wilson, tended to rely upon traditional elites and the emerging democratic groups were excluded from the process.
During the Patten years, consultation took rather different forms. Patten came to office with a commitment to more open government and spent much more time in discussions with legislators. As a result of the introduction of direct elections for some seats in 1991, there was also much more bargaining between government and Legislative Councillors. Yet political constraints on greater consultation and participation still remained. The government wanted to include pressure groups in the policy process but it could not afford protracted conflict with them at a time when relations with China were tense and when public confidence in the future of the system was low. Its strategy was to try to establish a value consensus -for example, that the education system needed to be reformed or that the quality of public housing needed to be improved -and formulated policies to meet those ends. But at points where it might be involved in conflict with pressure groups, it tended not to force the issue. Policy-making in that sense was symbolic; it could only be implemented provided that there were no groups likely to engage in political or industrial action.
Policy Content
By content, we mean the nature of the policy outputs that are representative of the period. Thus, following Lowi, we might describe the policies of the old colonial period as mainly regulatory, those of the later colonial period as largely distributive and symbolic, and those of the post-colonial period as largely unfocused but with elements of some of the policy-making concerns of the preceding systems.
19 It should not be assumed that these descriptions of policy-making encompass all policies made within a particular historical period. There has been nonetheless a dominant form of policy-making in each period which was determined by the factors that we have already considered, namely values, the location of power and the institutional framework, and the nature of consultation and participation.
Under colonialism, regulatory policy was seen to be the appropriate way to maintain the stability of the regime. The Societies Ordinance, the Education Ordinance and various labour regulations were used to control organisations, intervene in the school system, and fragment trade unions. 20 After the Second World War, regulatory policy was no longer sufficient and the administration began to make grudging accommodations in health, welfare, housing and education.
21 The MacLehose reforms brought collective goods in larger quantities: more school places, more hospital beds, increased social welfare, and a greater likelihood of securing a public housing flat. This expansion of social policy was a means of re-legitimating a regime that had singularly failed to provide adequately in these respects in the 1950s and 1960s. It had the effect of heightening expectations for even more, qualitatively better, collective goods.
After the 1984 agreement, policy remained largely distributive in terms of its overall emphasis but also took on more symbolic aspects. Regulation changed from a concern with control in the interests of maintaining stability to an attempt to ensure that standards were met in the provision of services. A more sophisticated economy required different types of regulation and important reforms were made, for example, in the banking sector. The government also sought to build confidence in the future by other means: by providing for a Bill of Rights and various forms of safeguards for civil liberties, by creating new universities and by constructing a new airport. Policy was used symbolically to persuade the people that post-1997 Hong Kong would be at least as prosperous and pleasant as in the past. In addition, the government tried to avoid becoming embroiled in contentious policy issues. In areas where it could not avoid making policy, the process of implementation was designed to minimise conflict and to allow the government to retreat if its proposed measures proved to be too controversial.
22
The Rational Policy-Maker
The political pre-conditions which aid rational policy-making include: government monopoly of the policy agenda; restrictions on the influence of the population on the way that decisions are made and the insulation of decision-makers from the political process; centralising the decision-making system to control resources and to attempt to avoid the development of potentially conflicting policies; acting authoritatively to reinforce the image of a government in command; and trying to match policy outputs to the prevailing political circumstances. How did these political pre-conditions translate into rational policy-making? Did the policy-makers hold a set of beliefs about the best way to make policy? If so, what were those beliefs?
In the course of the research for this book, interviews were conducted with 32 senior officials from seven different policy bureaus and sixteen different departments and statutory bodies.
23 All had held high office in the final years of the colonial administration and continued in senior positions after 1997. Seventeen of the 32 were administrative officers and had been transferred between bureaus, departments and statutory bodies in the course of their careers. What follows is a distillation of their beliefs about how policy should and should not be made.
A critical feature of successful policy-making, although few of the interviewees used the word, was that it should be rational, that is, that the government's response to a problem should be appropriate to provide a solution to present or future difficulties. The respondents drew attention to the need to ensure that there were adequate financial resources, that alternatives had been considered, that the problem had been properly discussed with all the relevant stakeholders, and that proper "homework" had been undertaken to stave off criticism and to defend the policy proposal against charges that there were better ways to proceed. The means to achieve these conditions for successful policy-making varied according to the nature of the problem. In some cases, the policymakers sought expert advice; in others, they surveyed public opinion; in still others, they undertook pilot schemes or conducted experiments. In each case, however, the aim was to construct a case for change as watertight as possible or, alternatively, to put the issue before the public in such a way that the problem was canvassed and the options presented, usually with the government making its preferred position clear.
A second element that was heavily stressed was the need for flexibility. One respondent quoted with approval the words of a long-standing Executive Councillor who advised policy secretaries that they should always give themselves room to "wriggle". In fact, in the last years of the colonial administration and after the handover, policy secretaries found it difficult to take unequivocal positions because the nature of the political process meant that criticism of their role was more intense than it had ever been before. The view of some respondents was that there should initially be a preferred government stance but that fall-back positions and contingency plans for changing circumstances were a necessary part of the process.
A third element was that the policy-maker should keep his or her distance from the politics of the policy process. "Don't eat with your chin" said one highly experienced official, meaning that the policy-maker should avoid becoming part of the public debate until an authoritative decision was required. This was, of course, part of the colonial culture of maintaining distance from the population. No government likes to back down on policy but there was always the suspicion that, if a colonial government did so, the legitimacy of its rule might be called into question. Decisions were generally not negotiable once the government had put its prestige on the line. The notion of distance from politics was also related to decision-making within the government. Most respondents believed that they should be politically neutral in the sense that they should give the "best" policy advice that they could. But there were concerns that this was being undermined in the post-1997 period. Many noted that "politics" were determining decision-making to a greater degree than in the past and that, implicitly, the "best" decision was not always reached because of considerations of political expediency. The ideal administrator was one who could distance himself or herself from the process and arrive at rational decisions after appropriate consultation with other policy actors.
In the following case study, we consider the application of rational decision-making to a volatile political issue. The methods used to deal with the problem are largely derived from long-standing beliefs in the value of rationality, flexibility and distance in dealing with policy problems.
Rational Policy-Making: Reducing Social Security Assistance Scheme
The Comprehensive Social Security Assistance Scheme (CSSA) was introduced in 1993, replacing a public assistance scheme which had provided only the most basic of social security benefits. The new scheme was rather more generous although it was constructed on a philosophy that was very similar to the one which had preceded it. Social security would be given to those who were needy in order to raise their incomes to meet essential requirements. The benefits were means-tested and all able unemployed people between 15 and 59 years of age were required to register with the Labour Department for job placement. The scheme provided for a range of standard rates for different categories of applicants, for rent and to meet special needs. At the end of 1993, there were 92,000 CSSA cases compared with 79,700 public assistance cases in the previous year and expenditure on the scheme was $2,073.8 million, an increase of 54.9 % over the previous year.
24 CSSA cases rose from 92,000 in 1993 to 195,645 in 1997. 25 The most significant increase in the number of new cases was in the unemployed whose numbers rose from 3,876 in 1993-1994 to 14,964 in 1996-97. 26 The increase came at a time of almost full employment in Hong Kong and suggested that those who were claiming unemployment benefits might be doing so because the payments were more attractive than working.
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In Tung's first policy address, he announced that there would be a review of the CSSA system and stressed that "we should not remove the incentive to work."
28 From the outset, the agenda for change was controlled by the civil service. The Steering Group which conducted the review was chaired by the Director of Social Welfare and its membership, with the exception of one member from the Employees Retraining Board, a statutory body, was composed entirely of civil servants. 29 There was no outside representation from those who might be affected by its decisions or from organisations, such as the Hong Kong Council of Social Service, which might have been expected to speak on behalf of the disadvantaged. Controlling the agenda meant that the Steering Group could define the problem. There was, it said, … growing public concern about the rapid growth in the CSSA caseload and its expenditure, the high level of CSSA benefit for larger families as compared with market wages, and sharp increases in the number of people of working age turning to CSSA. There is also an increasing perception that some people are abusing the system and as a result of this, increasing calls … for the Government to take more measures to prevent such abuses.
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The identification of the problem was accompanied by supporting statistics: the number of CSSA cases had increased by 146% between September 1993 and September 1998; expenditure had grown three-fold and was certain to rise still further; benefits were becoming more attractive because of the slow growth in wages; and CSSA payments for a family of four or more were considerably higher than low-end wages.
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The definition of the problem in this way rested on some assumptions about the motives of the recipients and pointed to possible solutions. The Group felt that there was "a tendency for some employable adults to consider reliance on welfare assistance as a preferred option even when there is employment available."
32 Clearly, this conflicted with the long-standing value that welfare would be provided only for so long as it took to return the able-bodied to the workforce. The solutions offered by the Steering Group, therefore, took aim at the unemployed and at benefits enjoyed by families which exceeded the wages of low-end workers. The proposals included slashing benefits, new programmes under which the unemployed CSSA beneficiaries would engage in unpaid community work, re-assessment of the asset limits for the unemployed, provisions to terminate CSSA benefits if the recipient refused reasonable employment, and strengthening existing arrangements to prevent fraud.
33 Even these measures, the Steering Group warned, would not prevent the growth in CSSA expenditure from increasing to the point where it was unsustainable.
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Their predictions proved to be correct. With the subsequent economic downturn, more poor migrants from China and growing number of elderly recipients of CSSA, the number of applicants and government expenditure rose dramatically. The number of cases increased from 195,645 in 1997 195,645 in to 288,648 in October 2003 35 The budget increased from $2.4 billion in 1993 to $9.4 billion in 1998 to $16 billion in 2002.
36 In the years immediately following the implementation of the Steering Group's recommendations, it appeared that the measures had some effect in discouraging new applicants for unemployment benefits. The number of new cases rose to 31,942 in 1998-99 but stabilised thereafter and even dropped in 2000.
37 But the number of low-earnings cases, whose incomes were supplemented by CSSA, continued to rise, suggesting that the slowing growth in wages and the benefits provided under CSSA were beginning to come closer than the government wished. As economic conditions worsened, the number of unemployed CSSA cases rose sharply. By September 2003, there were 51,372 unemployed cases, nearly double the number in March 2000.
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The government faced a potentially explosive situation. Any move to cut benefits further might have resulted in an even greater loss of political support and the growth of protest movements. On the other hand, expenditure on the CSSA was clearly spiralling out of control. In October 2002, the Director of Social Welfare, Carrie Lam, put the government's case in an article in the South China Morning Post. 39 The tone was coolly rational. The problem was presented as one which was not simply a matter for the government but for the society, a concern with how welfare provision should best reflect the values of the community. "The community," wrote Lam, "is compassionate towards the vulnerable when the economy is good and public finances permit … [but] expects vigilance by the administration in guarding CSSA from becoming a preferred alternative to work." 40 She then presented figures which showed that, as a result of negative growth in the economy the actual purchasing power of the CSSA was 12.4 % higher than at the time it was set in 1996. She concluded:
The issue now is whether CSSA rates should be reduced to restore purchasing power to the intended level, freeing up existing resources to help an anticipated increase in applicants. On a broader front, with the growing number of elderly, and an increasing number of low-income families, what should be done to ensure CSSA will continue to provide a strong financial safety net for the most vulnerable? These are questions on which we welcome public views.
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In fact, of course, the government had firm views on the direction in which it should proceed; it had framed the agenda and established what it perceived to be the principal problem that required attention; it wanted to reduce CSSA benefits by 11.1%. The invitation to the public to comment was not because the government was uncertain of its preferred policy direction but rather because it had to gauge whether the political effects of the reduction might potentially spill beyond the confines of the particular issue to a wholesale indictment of an unpopular regime.
Over the next few weeks, the debate intensified. On 11 November, the Director of Social Welfare met with the Legislative Council Panel on Welfare Services, some invited individuals and representatives of ten pressure groups and the Hong Kong Council of Social Service to discuss the CSSA issue.
42 She stressed that the administration had not yet come to a view on whether the CSSA should be adjusted downwards by 11.1% although she explained how that figure had been calculated. The pressure groups and many legislators were, as might be expected, mainly opposed to any reduction. In her concluding remarks, the Director sought to address some of their concerns. She emphasised that the effects of deflation on wages and the CSSA benefits had been calculated in a methodical manner, that the government had always drawn a distinction between the able-bodied who could work and those who could not, and that the reduction was not about the budget deficit and saving money but about distributing benefits more equitably.
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A few days after the meeting, Christine Fang, the Director of the Hong Kong Council of Social Service, a government-funded statutory body that acts on behalf of subvented welfare organisations, challenged many of the government's central assumptions.
44 She noted that almost 80% of CSSA recipients were elderly, disabled or infirm or single parent families, few of whom had chances of finding work, and that the unemployed had been unfairly maligned. People who lost their jobs did not immediately turn to the Social Welfare Department; only 14.3% of the unemployed received CSSA benefits. 45 She also cast doubt on the central plank of the government's argument that CSSA benefits were too high, claiming instead that wages were too low and would be pushed lower if the CSSA was cut. In place of reduced benefits, Fang suggested that there was a need for a comprehensive review of the CSSA system and that reductions in benefits should not be treated simply as a budget deficit issue.
The Democratic Party and the major unions, who regarded CSSA recipients as their constituents, were also highly critical of the proposed course of action. The government, however, remained steadfast. The changes, which reduced the standard rate allowances for the able-bodied by 11.1% from June 2003 and the benefits for the elderly, disabled, and infirm by the same amount in two phases, starting in October 2003, were approved by the Executive Council in February 2003. 46 The day following the announcement, a motion without legislative effect was introduced into the Legislative Council opposing the "cutbacks in welfare benefits for the elderly, the vulnerable and the disabled." 47 There were some differences between the parties on the proposed measures. The Democratic Party argued that it was wrong in principle to cut benefits again when they had already been cut following the 1998 review. 48 The DAB, while supporting the adjustment downwards, argued that it should not apply to the elderly and the disabled. 49 The Liberal Party, which supported the provision of CSSA benefits for the elderly and the disabled although not for the unemployed, favoured the course of action proposed by the government. 50 Frontier was opposed to the cuts on the moral ground that they would detrimentally affect the quality of lives of the recipients.
51 The government remained unmoved. The Secretary for Health, Welfare and Food noted that the measures should not be regarded as welfare cuts but rather an effort "to return rates to their original intended buying power so as to ensure the financial sustainability of our social security system."
52 The motion condemning the cutbacks was passed without dissent and 90 pressure groups later demonstrated against the government's action.
53 But the planned reductions went ahead and were given legislative effect with the passage of the budget in April 2003.
The reduction in CSSA rates stands as an example of successful policy formulation and implementation in difficult times. Why did the government succeed in this instance when it failed in so many others? Each of the characteristics of rational policy-making, identified earlier in interviews with senior officials, was present in the process. First, the government controlled the agenda and focused its energies on a specific change. The Director of Social Welfare did not allow herself to be deflected into other conceptions of the problem or even to enter the political fray to debate them. She defended the proposal with an array of statistics and with such vigour that she became known, to her annoyance, as the "figures lady." "Figures," she said, 'have helped me to convince others when implementing some policies. We could not solve problems with emotions alone." 54 The proposal was carefully explained, placed in the context of the government's overall welfare policy, and always defended in terms of the greater equity that would ensue from a re-distribution of benefits to new, deserving applicants. It was not only presented as a logical and rational course of action; it was presented as the only logical and rational course of action.
A second characteristic of rational policy-making identified in the interviews with senior officials was flexibility. The government made its views known on its preferred proposal from a very early stage. It did not, however, finally commit itself to a course of action until the final inclusion of the reductions in the budget. Even in the motion debate in February 2003, the Secretary for Health, Welfare and Food still spoke of the reductions as a proposal. Flexibility also meant listening to the proposals from interested individuals and pressure groups although the government made few concessions. It delayed the cuts to non-able-bodied recipients to October 2003 and October 2004, a similar strategy to that employed over civil service pay reductions. But there were no other substantive concessions to any particular group of CSSA recipients.
Finally, the Director of Social Welfare was careful to keep her distance from the political process. She did meet with pressure groups and representatives of the political parties but she did not bargain with them. Rather, she saw her role as listening to their proposals and arguments, perhaps with a view to developing contingency plans should they have proven necessary. In the event, the reductions to the CSSA came when the government was considering implementing Article 23 and when SARS was becoming a serious problem and these developments soon took centre stage. The success of the government's proposals was also aided by the division within the parties and pressure groups. In comparison with the range of other options available, the government's proposal had the advantage of clarity, political appeal to the values of hard work and to the development of programmes returning recipients to gainful employment, sensitivity to equity and future requirements of the welfare system, and a continuing emphasis on the traditional virtue of fiscal frugality.
Politics and Policy-Making after 1997
Although rational policy-making has persisted in the post-handover system, particularly in areas less controversial than reductions to welfare benefits, it is better suited to systems where policy-makers can remain aloof from the politics of the process and retain control of the agenda. In the post-handover system, with the difficulties inherent in the institutional framework and the increased politicisation of the policy process, a new mode of making policy, rather closer to the conditions underlying Kingdon's "three streams" approach, began to emerge. In the following sections, we examine the characteristics of the approach and compare it, using the example of the government's attempt to merge universities, with the rational approach.
The Post-1997 Policy Agenda
What values does the post-1997 government seek to realise through policy? And how do these differ from those that it inherited? In his first policy address in October 1997, the Chief Executive stressed many of the values that we have already identified: government was to be even more proactive in meeting the needs of the business community; the new political system would promote political stability; government would look after the interests of the population by making policy in many different areas; law and order would be maintained; and the administration would continue to deliver policy outputs efficiently, effectively and economically.
55 Aside from stressing that Hong Kong was now part of China, the 1997 policy address might have been delivered by a British Governor.
Within a few years, the tone had changed. In his re-election speech, Tung claimed that the government had successfully taken a different direction since the handover although he conceded that some of the policy initiatives might have been handled differently.
56 There was more stress on the need for economic re-structuring, of enhancing relations with China and of re-vamping the structure of government. 57 The problem was that the administration faced an economic crisis virtually from the moment it assumed office and this placed many of the traditional regime values to which the political executive subscribed under threat. Thus, for example, the Chief Executive, most members of the Executive Council and many members of the Legislative Council were in favour of more de-regulation and small government. But the economic crises led to calls for more government intervention and help in times of hardship. There were signs that the government itself was not adverse to intervention under some circumstances. 58 But this left the basis on which policy was to be made somewhat ad hoc and without the more consistent regime value parameters that had characterised the colonial government.
Similar problems arose with establishing values authoritatively on the agenda. Because the government was under challenge from many different quarters and lacked support from the public, it found the process of introducing policy changes much more difficult than it had anticipated. Alternative policies were being canvassed in the legislature and often enjoyed the support of the voting public. One former legislator, Christine Loh, for example, through the think tank, Civic Exchange, produced an annual alternative policy address which picked up many of the issues that democrats wanted to see on the agenda. 59 The disarticulated political system of post-1997 Hong Kong enabled such values not only to be expressed but also to gain support and to act as an impediment to the realisation of the government's own goals. 60 The government was not entirely in control of its own agenda.
The Institutional Framework
The institutional framework inherited by the new political executive after 1997 was deficient in a number of important respects. The Basic Law did not specify sufficiently how institutions would co-ordinate policy. Rather, it was assumed that they would co-operate. In the event, there was considerable friction between them. Under Tung, the executive was not unified and there were major differences in approach and values between the business and professional appointees on the Executive Council and senior civil servants. The businessmen wanted change within the civil service which would improve efficiencies and reduce costs and they saw the civil service as an obstruction to rapid change. They wanted new policies that would aid business, including government initiatives with the private sector, and more cost-effective delivery of social policy outputs. Senior civil servants may not have been directly opposed to those aims but they wanted policy to continue to be driven by the civil service with careful attention to rationality, costs and strategies for implementation. This resulted in a struggle on some issues between Executive Council members and senior civil servants over policymaking style with the Councillors favouring new, sometimes uncosted, ideas, and the civil servants preferring to rely on well-established procedures.
One of the consequences of a disarticulated system is that power is diffused rather than centralised. As Kingdon remarks, under such circumstances, policy ideas may come from anywhere but may still have some prospect of reaching the agenda.
61 Whereas under colonialism, the senior civil service held a monopoly over which proposals would succeed and which would fail, in post-1997 Hong Kong, ideas could be picked up from any one of a number of sources: pressure groups, political parties, the Legislative Council, the political executive or the Chinese government. The prospects for their formulation into tangible policies could be increased by endorsement from either the civil service or the political executive where they might then follow either one of two routes. The first would see the proposal move through the civil service and eventually be presented for public discussion with the agreement of the political executive. Alternatively, policy might be generated from the top down by the political executive. The latter route appeared to become more prevalent after the introduction of the Principal Officials Accountability System in July 2002. The problem was that top-down policy announcements tended to unravel in the process of turning them into a concrete set of proposals for implementation.
The disarticulated system meant that institutions were poorly co-ordinated and did not work together to formulate coherent policy. After Donald Tsang became Chief Executive, there was some attempt to improve policy co-ordination by defining lines of command and lateral communication more precisely. But while the government began to act more as a team than it had done under Tung, its policy capacity did not greatly increase. The problem lay at the interface between government and civil society. The government's proposals were generally better thought through under Tsang, and it remained highly competent and efficient in administering existing policies, but gaining public acceptance for new policies remained as difficult as ever.
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Consultation and Participation after 1997
The post-1997 government did not initially believe that it faced the same constraints as the transitional colonial administration and it soon sought to address some of the policy issues that had been swept under the carpet. Its problem, as gradually became apparent, was that it did not have a mandate. In a disarticulated system, groups could claim that their policies were more sensible than, and just as authoritative as, those of the government. In education, for example, the government was faced with a shifting coalition of opposition, depending on the issues at stake. On benchmarking the curriculum, the school-based management system and mother tongue teaching, the Professional Teachers Union, individual teachers, churches, parents and even students were in conflict with some aspects of government policy.
63 Moreover, because the government's policy intentions were less ambivalently stated than during the transitional period, there was an opportunity for pressure groups to make their case to the general public rather than agree to a government-engineered consensus. The situation was further exacerbated by the tension between the government and the Legislative Council, particularly immediately after the handover when Councillors felt that they were not being adequately informed by the government. The Council became a sounding board for those who had policy positions opposed to the government. Other pressure groups took to the streets to articulate their demands.
The government did not attempt to ram its policies through without consultation. The formal aspects of the consultation process remained in place. The green papers of colonial days were replaced by consultation documents on many different aspects of government policy. These included, for example, the decision to abolish the Urban and Regional Councils, the decision to introduce anti-subversion and anti-secession legislation under Article 23, matters relating to executive and advisory bodies in education, the development of traditional Chinese medicine, the goods and services tax and healthcare financing.
64 Despite its commitment to the formal consultative process, the Tung administration was also prone to making announcements from the top which arrived on the agenda without prior consultation or notice. In the decision to provide 85,000 flats a year, which was later abandoned, in its educational policies, in the decision to create a cyberport and to provide government funding for the construction of a Disneyland, in the bid for the Asian games, and in the announcement of proposals to merge the Chinese University, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and the Hong Kong Institute of Education, the government simply laid out its proposals and ultimately bore the wrath of a highly critical public.
65 In a remarkable mea culpa in 2005, Tung admitted the shortcomings of this approach. He said:
In formulating policies, we fell short of "thinking what the people think" and "addressing people's needs"...we were not sufficiently mindful of the impact of some policies on the community... and the potentially controversial nature of those policies. We introduced too many reform measures too hastily... We also lacked a sense of crisis, political sensitivity as well the necessary experience and capability to cope with political and economic changes. We were indecisive when dealing with emergencies. These shortcomings and inadequacies have undermined the credibility of our policy-making capability and our ability to govern.
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After Tsang assumed office, there were efforts to establish more consultative institutions at the centre, in particular, the Commission on Strategic Development, which had existed under Tung but was now expanded and charged with "making policy formulation more scientific and transparent," and the Commission on Poverty which was "to make policy recommendations to prevent and alleviate poverty and promote self-reliance."
67 Neither body achieved the aim of producing solutions to problems that could be implemented as policy. 68 Rather, they tended to reflect the conflicting values of representatives selected from different parts of the political spectrum. What perhaps offers more hope of resolving the impasse in making policy is civic engagement with those directly affected by new proposals. To date, the government does not appear to have a consistent approach on civic engagement. On some issues, it consults widely and interacts with stakeholders; on others, there appears to be very little consultation. Research suggests, however, that the more the government talks to relevant groups, the more likely it is to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. 69 Civic engagement seems to work to the extent that it brings public attention to the issues and involves some actors in the process although there are still problems of trust and government domination of the agenda.
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The difficulties in bringing new policies into effect are shown in Table 8 .1. In all but one of the cases listed, opposition to government policy has either delayed or prevented the introduction of the policy. The exceptional case of the implementation of soccer betting suggests that policy acceptance is sometimes more a matter of fortuna than of rational calculation. Had the DAB not split on the issue, the Legislative Council would have rejected the government's proposal. Another example, which also illustrates Kingdon's theories, is the introduction of legislation to ban smoking in public places. In 2001, in difficult economic conditions and opposition from the catering industry, the government did not proceed with the legislation. Four years later, in a time of greater prosperity, virtually the same proposal was approved by the Legislative Council.
71 In Kingdon's terms, there had been no coupling of the problem, politics and policy streams in 2001; by 2005, there was a window of opportunity through which the policy could be introduced. In the case of small class teaching, the government initially approached the issue in a rational manner and employed a consultant to examine the effects of small class teaching in a pilot study. He found that small class teaching had little relationship to improved learning except for the mentally disabled. 72 The government, under pressure from legislators and teachers, decided nonetheless that it would proceed with the proposal. In two other cases -the Independent Police Complaints Council Ordinance and the Race Discrimination Ordinance -there was fierce criticism of the government's proposals and the bills were probably only passed because legislators felt they would make some improvements to the existing situation, even if fundamental issues had been ignored. In each of these instances, policy was being made in a highly politicised context which created the conditions in which no government proposal is authoritative and may subsequently be abandoned, delayed or implemented with considerable modifications.
Policy Failures and Policy Fiascos
A policy failure refers to "performance defects of any size or seriousness which may or may not be politicised" whereas a policy fiasco refers to situations where there is "subjectively significant social damage" and that are "highly politicized."
73 Governments usually seek to minimise the damage from policy failures so that they do not turn into policy fiascos. This has been difficult in Hong Kong since 1997, partly because the political system is not able to contain demands or to reduce adverse criticism in the ways that were used by its colonial predecessor.
How do we explain these failures which turned into fiascos? As we have seen, a critical factor has been the rise of civil society organisations and their importance in ensuring the success, or otherwise, of a policy proposal. There are always alternative policies waiting in the wings or, to put it another way, government policy proposals are not regarded as authoritative. Why they are not regarded as authoritative may relate in part to the style in which they are presented although it may also be a function of a disarticulated system where it is quite likely that legislators or political parties or civil society organisations will have alternative agendas. This can be contrasted with the style of policy-making under colonialism where the process was closed and controlled and where policy statements, once made, were regarded as definitive. This older style of policy-making persists when issues are not controversial. Where the political executive is not directly involved or where it chooses to follow a less public course of action and where public suspicions have not been aroused, it is still possible to make policies that proceed in more orderly fashion through the stages that we have identified.
The problem for the government is that almost all issues are at least potentially controversial. The dynamics of the post-handover period have made the process much less rational, much more difficult to bring new policies on line, much more determined by immediate political considerations, and much more likely to fail at the implementation stage. In the following case study, we examine some of the weaknesses of policy-making under conditions where a rational, controlled approach was not followed, where policy directives were issued from the top, where there were entrenched stakeholders who were not consulted, and where the characteristics of rational policy-making -precise identification of the problem, flexibility in seeking a solution, and distance from the political process -were either not observed or not possible.
Policy-Making in a Disarticulated System
In the interviews with senior officials, the point was frequently made that the policy process had become more "political". Most of the examples provided were either of uncosted policy proposals emanating from the Executive Council or from its decision to treat a problem in an entirely different way from that intended by the civil service. The Legislative Council was also seen as a body which had considerable influence over policy although usually, from the standpoint of the respondents, in a negative way. Pressure groups were regarded as important to the success of the implementation process and in some, but not all, bureaus and departments they were part of a regular, institutionalised consultative forum.
With the introduction of the Principal Officials Accountability System in July 2002, top-down pressures on the civil service intensified. One of the intentions of the new system was to increase co-ordination in policy formulation and to make implementation more effective. 74 This was a response to the policy failures of the previous period and may have been taken as an implicit criticism of the way that the civil service was making policy. Directors of Bureaus were supposed to be transformational innovators who would resolve the problems that were afflicting their policy areas. This type of top-down policy might be characterised as "ideational" in the sense that it seeks to bring about change rapidly without too much concern for the details of implementation or for the possibility of alternative courses of action; it is based on what seems to be "a good idea" at the time. In Chapter 9, we consider several examples of "good ideas" that failed at the implementation stage. In the following case study, we consider a "good idea" that did not survive the policy formulation stage and examine the reasons for its failure.
Merging the Universities
In 2002, Hong Kong had eight government-funded degree-granting tertiary institutions. When the budgetary deficit became an issue, there were those who believed that eight institutions was a luxury for a population of 6.8 million and that substantial savings could be achieved by rationalisation. By that stage, the universities were jealous protectors of their own autonomy. They were, moreover, somewhat insulated from sudden changes in government policies by the University Grants Committee (UGC), a statutory body which funded universities on a triennial basis, delaying the impact of financial cutbacks.
In October 2002, the Secretary of Education and Manpower, Professor Arthur Li, who had previously been Vice-Chancellor of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), announced that CUHK, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST) and the Hong Kong Institute of Education would merge. 75 There was some confusion about the announcement. It came during a press conference in which the Secretary appeared to be testing the water for some new ideas in higher education. But the announcement was not followed by a regular press release. There was no official statement on the merger and there were few details available on how the Secretary intended the merger to proceed. It was also unclear to what extent senior civil servants in the Education and Manpower Bureau and the UGC had been consulted. What was clear was that the Secretary was not basing his ideas for a merger on the savings to be derived from economic rationalisation. He promised that there would be no redundancies after the merger and based his case for amalgamation on the more nebulous goal of creating a "world-class" university.
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The undefined goal of a "world-class" university raised questions about the status of specific institutions and about the future of other universities in the SAR. There had been only limited prior consultation with the Vice-Chancellors about the proposal and none at all with the President of the Institute of Education or with the staff or students of the two universities. Li described himself as only a "matchmaker" but he was also reported to have said that if "universities refuse the merger and ignore the entire well being of Hong Kong, the government would take action …" and that the government would force the merger through even if staff and students were opposed to it. 77 Apart from the political consequences of the decision, the Secretary's action appeared to encroach upon the role of the UGC which had responsibility for tertiary institutions and which subsequently set up its own working party to examine the question of institutional integration.
There had been some discussion of the need for Hong Kong's universities to aspire to international excellence in a report commissioned by the University Grants Committee (UGC), the Sutherland Report, where the notion of a "world-class university" was described as "an elusive and…resource intensive flower." 78 The issue of whether Hong Kong should have a world-class university -and indeed what a world-class university was -soon became intertwined with the radical changes to Hong Kong higher education proposed in the Sutherland Report which was adopted, with some additions, by the UGC and the government. These changes included, inter alia, role and mission differentiation, a review of sub-degree programmes and de-linking university salaries from civil service salaries, apparently because this was seen as a hindrance to recruiting staff with world-class reputations from overseas. 79 On 28 October, when the Legislative Council Panel on Education wanted to question the Secretary on his merger proposal, he was abroad and the discussion was postponed. The Panel soon turned its attention to the very substantive issues raised by the UGC proposals. 80 In its brief to the Legislative Council on its proposals, the UGC did not support a merger although it did note that the proposed changes to the higher education system might aid such a development and that the Chinese University and the University of Science and Technology had set up committees to investigate the possibility.
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In the interim, opposition to the merger had grown. Reaction to the Secretary's comments in the universities was predictable. Staff and students at both universities organised against the proposal and received wide support. A few days after the announcement, a campaign at HKUST had already collected 250 signatures from staff; of 649 students polled in all tertiary institutions, 65% were opposed to the merger. 82 In November, 1,707 of 2,000 HKUST students voted against the change.
83 In December, the Chairman of the HKUST Council announced that the university would not pursue talks on the merger unless the government clarified a number of key issues. 84 In the following year, although there were signs that there was some support for the proposal at the Chinese University, both staff and students at the HKUST and at the Institute of Education continued to oppose it. In December 2003, in what looked to be another policy reversal, Tung said that he did not think that eight tertiary institutions were too many.
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In January 2004, the UGC produced another policy paper on higher education which carried forward its notion of role differentiation. Each of the degree-granting institutions was to have a defined role to which they were expected to remain "faithful" and Hong Kong was to play a role as an "educational regional hub."
86 There was no mention of "world-class universities" but the UGC's Working Party on Institutional Integration put the final nail in the proposal when it found that "while a merger between CUHK and HKUST might become viable at some point in the future, it should not be further explored for the present."
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In retrospect, it is not difficult to understand why the proposal failed. What is more interesting, perhaps, is to compare the way in which it was handled with the way in which the Director of Social Welfare presented her case for the reduction in CSSA benefits. With the merger proposal, the problem which the amalgamation of the universities and the Institute was seeking to address was never very well identified. Even if a merger had created a world-class university, it was not clear what particular benefits would ensue for Hong Kong. There was also an alternative agenda. The UGC, backed by the authority of the Sutherland Report, had proposals which would define the role of the tertiary institutions more precisely and which would save the government money. Its proposals were much closer to the government's thinking and did not involve the potentially expensive re-structuring which would have resulted from the merger. And although the UGC's proposals might equally cause unrest in the universities, they did not come with the immediate political costs which the Secretary's proposal had already provoked. With the CSSA reductions, although there were real political costs in terms of support for the government, there were also savings from reducing benefits which could be used to provide for the expected increasing number of future CSSA applicants. The proposals to merge the universities, by contrast, had the potential for many different kinds of unintended consequences.
In terms of flexibility, although the Social Welfare Department's position on the CSSA reductions was well known, the government's final commitment to that position was delayed until the last possible minute. On the merger proposal, the Secretary made a strong commitment to amalgamation and then appeared to put the entire weight of government behind his proposal. He was perceived to be threatening to implement the proposal in the face of considerable opposition rather than listening to opponents and presenting cogent reasons for his stance. The consequence was that there was little room for manoeuvre. The merger proposal was reduced to a zero sum game; either implementation went ahead or it did not. No other options for merged departments or cost-sharing without full amalgamation were explored. As the South China Morning Post editorialised, "however strong the case for merging some institutions may be, Professor Li's top-down approach is not conducive to a rational discussion of its pros and cons."
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In the case of the CSSA reductions, the Director of Social Welfare maintained her distance from the politics of the process. She listened to the views of political parties and pressure groups but declined to bargain with them. Unmoved to make major concessions, she was thus able to retain authority to make the final decision while claiming to have been consultative and open to persuasion. The Secretary of Education and Manpower, too, maintained his distance from the politics of the process. But, unlike the Director of Social Welfare, who made sure that the government's position was well argued in the press and before the relevant committees, the Secretary did not have strong institutional support for his proposal. He was unable to argue his case before the Legislative Council Panel on Education and no papers on the merger appear to have gone to the Executive Council. He did not present his own case in the media but rather relied on it to report his views which it did extensively but not always, apparently, with accuracy.
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Distance from the political process is important to preserve the authority of the decision. However, for the decision to have authority, institutional support for the policy stance needs to be in place. Despite the Secretary's strong position on amalgamation, there was never clear institutional support from other parts of government or from the Legislative Council or other policy actors. The UGC eventually emerged with an alternative agenda. The authoritative nature of a decision depends in part on the surety that it will be implemented. Much of the difficulties of policy implementation in the post-handover period derive from the lack of authority behind the decision. In the case of the CSSA reductions, the authority existed because the principal actors knew that the government could attain its ends by simple budgetary provisions; in the case of the merger, those responsible for implementing the proposal were beyond the reach of government and, in many cases, were opposed to the proposal.
It is perhaps helpful to think of the policy process in Hong Kong as a continuum. In its initial form, the state dominated the formulation and implementation of policy with little reference to the society or those affected by its actions; policy itself was action taken in support of maintaining stability and colonial rule and it was made rationally with those interests in mind. In the reformed colonial system, the state continued to control the policy agenda although some attempt was made to incorporate community interests. Policy continued to be made rationally but the focus shifted from regulatory policies to distributive policies and, in the latter years of colonial rule, was sometimes more symbolic than substantive. "Stability and prosperity" remained the government's mantra although other values had become more important. In the mixed policy-making system of the immediate post-1997 period, rational policy-making co-existed with ex cathedra pronouncements on policy from the political executive, a government with low policy capacity, a volatile political environment, and a disarticulated system which had the effect of compressing issues of values, formulation and implementation into a single event rather than a series of distinct stages. The government became less confrontational in its approach under Tsang but many of the fundamental political problems remained.
Rational policy-making is based on the assumption that the political process can be controlled and that appropriate, cost-effective solutions can be developed to resolve problems. It is predicated on the insulation of policy-makers from partisan values which may deflect them from arriving at economically rational decisions. The post-1997 system does not insulate policy-makers from political pressures. It is much more diverse and pluralistic. While power is formally centralised, it is in reality diffuse. Successful policy-making consequently depends on a window of opportunity, a fortunate political conjunction of perceived problems with appropriate solutions. The prospect for failure in such circumstances is much greater than in a controlled political system not only at the formulation stage but also when policies have to be implemented in what is frequently a hostile environment.
